Death Ride of the Panzers Page 2
Many histories describing the battles around Mortain, including the official US Army account, accept that small, isolated American units were able to hold off up to four elite German armored divisions, two infantry divisions, and a number of powerful armored Kampfgruppen until reinforcements were able to resolve the situation. If the German units available to Kluge had been at anywhere near full strength, he would have had at his disposal tens of thousands of men and hundreds of armored vehicles. But the truth is that the German formations were so depleted that at best the divisions were little more than strong brigades. A typical example would be the Kampfgruppe made up from the survivors of 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Götz von Berlichingen. The division had been decimated after resisting the American breakthrough at Saint Lô during the early stages of Operation Cobra and was surrounded at Coutances, where it lost most of its remaining equipment. By early August, the division consisted of a number of small battle groups. The strongest of these was Kampfgruppe Ulrich, made up from a single Panzergrenadier battalion supported by a number of PzKw IV tanks, which had been detached from SS-Panzer-Regiment 2. They were, in all probability, all five combat-ready tanks that the regiment possessed at that time. The strongest unit available to Kluge was 116.Panzer-Division with perhaps sixty Panthers, although the recalcitrance of the divisional commander, General Gerhard Graf von Schwerin, did almost as much to hamper the attack as did the stubborn American resistance. By the afternoon of August 6, just hours before the attack was scheduled to begin, elements of only three Panzer divisions and one Panzergrenadier division had made their way to the Mortain area with parts of 1.SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, which had been expected to move over 60 kilometers during the hours of darkness, struggling to reach their assembly points.5 Late in the evening a dense fog descended on the area. Just after midnight, as some units from the Leibstandarte division were still arriving at their designated jumping-off points, the attack went forward.
The two battle groups of 2.SS-Panzer-Division, under the overall command of Brigadeführer Otto Baum, pushed ahead to Mortain and in total darkness took the town by storm, capturing intact a battalion headquarters of the US 120th Infantry Regiment. Realizing that he must keep moving towards the west if the operation was to have any chance of success, Baum urged his men on, racing down the road from Mortain to Saint-Hilaire-du-Harcouët and securing the high ground north of Milly, threatening the town of Saint-Hilaire. Unknown to Baum, this was the junction of the US 1st and 3rd Armies. His presence there finally prompted the American command to take the attack seriously and despatch a combined arms force from the US 3rd Armored Division into the area.
The rapid advance of Baum’s Kampfgruppe had left in its wake a single battalion of the US 120th Infantry Regiment, which had managed to hold on to Hill 317, located just to the east of Mortain at the edge of a forest. As the fog began to lift, the Americans on Hill 317 realized that they could easily observe every German unit in the area and proceeded to call down artillery fire, which increased in accuracy as the weather cleared. The small garrison on Hill 317 defended their position stubbornly, and despite determined attacks by the Grenadiers of the Götz von Berlichingen, division they managed to hold on and proved to be a thorn in the side of the German offensive throughout the battle.
To the north of Mortain, the first of the two battlegroups made up from elements of 2.Panzer-Division, on the right of the division’s front, had thrust deep into the American lines. It had encountered little opposition save for being briefly delayed by a minefield, which accounted for the popular and experienced commander of Panzer-Regiment 3, Major Hans Schneider-Kostalski, who had been coordinating the attack. After the mines were cleared, the tanks continued on to le-Mesnil-Adelée, over 10 kilometers to the north-west of Mortain, brushing aside the US 119th Infantry Regiment and entering the village as the sun was rising. The second battlegroup, although moving off some two hours late, advanced rapidly and took advantage of the thick fog to captur the village of Bellefontaine.
By 5:00 am, the tanks of the right-hand column of 2.Panzer-Division were engaged in a firefight with a US Tank Destroyer battalion in front of Saint-Barthélemy and lost a number of vehicles before the town was eventually taken, although the American claim of forty German tanks destroyed is certainly exaggerated (official German records giving a figure of fourteen). However, the Germans could go no further, running into the lead elements of US 3rd Armored Division, which was being hurriedly moved forward. To make matters worse, the thick curtain of fog had started to lift and many of the German units, which by know had learnt to anticipate the inevitable Allied air-strikes, began to take to take up defensive positions and camouflage their tanks as best they could. The first American fighter-bombers had appeared over Mortain during the early morning, and before midday the skies were filled with Allied aircraft that ranged across the battlefield for more than three hours. Claims of over 100 German tanks destroyed are, however, certainly exaggerated and it is likely that American artillery units accounted for most of the German casualties and material losses. In spite of Görings promise that almost 1,000 Luftwaffe aircraft would support Kluge’s offensive, not a single German fighter reached the Mortain area.
The Mortain counterattack had cost Funck’s Panzerkorps the better part of its armored strength that could not be replaced and would surely have been more profitably used in the defensive operations of the coming weeks. Although localized skirmishes continued throughout the next day and Funck dutifully prepared for another assault, as ordered by Hitler, the rapidly deteriorating situation all along the front ensured there would be no further offensive operations at Mortain.
The prediction made by the commander of I.SS-Panzerkorps, Oberstgruppenführer Josef ‘Sep’ Dietrich, that depleting the Caen defenses of an armored reserve in order to prop up Kluge’s offensive would lead to the fall of the city proved entirely correct. On August 8, 1944, the same day it was finally decided to abandon the attacks around Mortain, units of US 3rd Army captured Le Mans. Le Mans had been the headquarters of Hausser’s 7.Armee and its loss threatened the German units in Normandy with encirclement. The infantry divisions of General Adolf-Friedrich Kuntzen’s LXXXI.Armeekorps could do little to stop the Americans and the irreplaceable tanks of 9.Panzer-Division, which had originally been promised to Kluge, were fed into the battle piece by piece.
On the same day US Army units entered Le Mans, the British and Canadian forces around Caen launched a major offensive, codenamed Totalise, aimed at the high ground north of the town of Falaise, about 25 kilometers south of Caen. Despite a massive artillery bombardment and the employment of specially converted personnel carriers, the British and Canadians, in two days of desperate fighting, were able to progress less than halfway to their objective down the Route de Falaise before the advance began to stall. Only by chance were units of Oberführer Kurt Meyer ‘s 12.SS-Panzer-Division Hitler Jugend in the area, having been ordered to Mortain. By this time, Meyer’s division had been reduced to two under-strength battle groups. The first and most powerful was led by Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche, the commander of SS-Panzer-Regiment 12. In addition to his regiment’s third and eighth companies equipped with Panther and Pzkw IV tanks, Wünsche could count on the Tigers of 2.Kompanie, schwere-SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101, and the under-strength first and second battalions of SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 26. Meyer also had at his disposal Kampfgruppe Waldmüller, made up of parts of the second battalion of SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 and a company from SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 12. With the survivors of 89.Infanterie-division, Meyer’s men did much to halt the Allied offensive, denying Potigny to the British and thereby holding onto the Caen-Falaise road.
Renewing the attack on August 10, the Canadians reached the high ground north of Falaise but, exhausted and facing determined opposition, they were unable to advance any further. The following morning, the Canadian corps commander replaced his armored divisions with infantry formations, effectively admitting that the offensive w
as at an end. Once again, as they often did in Normandy, the Germans had been able to scrape together just enough men and tanks to hold their line. Meyer’s fortuitous initiative, bordering on insubordination, in refusing to move his division to Mortain probably made the crucial difference.
Nothing could, however, alter the fact that the Americans were steadily approaching from the south and, in the end, the pressure from the British and Canadians in the north must succeed in breaking the German front. Indeed, the British commander Montgomery, rather unusually supported by Patton, now suggested that the only option left to the Germans was a general retreat to the east and, in his view, the British should forego the capture of Falaise and instead strike towards the Seine while the Americans block the escape route through the Loire valley.6
Hitler, characteristically, had other ideas and refused to allow a single unit to be withdrawn. In addition, the Führer persisted in his view that the British divisions were the main threat. Hitler ignored the advice of Kluge, who pointed out that the US Army had just kicked Hausser’s 7.Armee out of its headquarters at Le Mans and pinned down the tanks of 9.Panzer-Division in the south. When the American offensive resumed, Patton’s 3rd Army was able to advance to Alençon by August 12, 1944, and after beating off a strong German counter thrust by the tanks of Panzergruppe Eberbach, found themselves on the outskirts of Argentan by the following day, an advance of over 70 kilometers from their start point.7
With the major prize of Argentan in sight, and the defenders in disarray, the local American commander received an order to halt and then, to his astonishment, to withdraw. The reason given was that the British were advancing from the north and were determined to avoid any friendly-fire incidents. The origins of this extraordinary order have never been satisfactorily explained and debate still rages over the identity of the author. In any case, a large gap of almost 20 kilometers in width was left open between Argentan in the south and Falaise in the north, both of which were still in German hands, which presented the Germans with the opportunity of escape. In addition, the short pause in the fighting allowed Kluge to reorganize his remaining armored reserves for the desperate struggle he knew was about to take place.
Just after midday on August 14, 1944, a new British offensive codenamed Tractable commenced with tanks and infantry advancing behind a dense smoke screen. The plan called for units of Canadian 1st Army, supported by the newly arrived Polish 1st Armored Division, to take Falaise by midnight of the first day and then move on to Trun, almost 20 kilometers to the south-east. From there, an advance to nearby Chambois would enable a link up with the Americans. Unlike previous operations, this assault would take place in daylight.
In one of those unbelievable chance occurrences, which seem to happen all too frequently in war, a Canadian officer carrying a complete set of plans for the coming operation drove into the German lines only hours before the offensive was about to begin. In short order the Allied plans were in the hands of the redoubtable Oberführer Meyer, whose 12.SS-Panzer-Division battle groups had done so much to halt Operation Totalise just days earlier. With every detail of the Allies intentions known to him, Meyer was able to make the most of his meager resources and placed his few remaining tanks and infantry along the Caen-Falaise road, where they were able to intercept the main Canadian drive. Although the smoke screen at first hampered the German defenders, a company of twelve 8.8 cm Pak 43 anti-tank guns were able to inflict severe casualties on the Canadian armored units, destroying a large number of tanks, including that of the killing the brigade commande and killing the entire crew. Despite the mounting casualties, the Canadians continued to attack throughout the remainder of the day, at one point meeting head-on a counterattack made by the Tigers of 2.Kompanie, schwere-SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102.8
As darkness fell, parts of two Canadian infantry divisions had reached the high ground north of Falaise but were unable to break through the German defenders and enter the town. Further to the north, the Poles had taken Potigny earlier that afternoon.
Early on the following day, both the Canadian and Polish armored divisions resumed their drive south-east, pushing Meyer’s men back towards the town of Falaise. At the same time on the left flank, the two infantry divisions which had gained the heights to the north-east of the town pushed south. At the end of another day’s fierce fighting, Sherman tanks of 1st Canadian Army were in Soulangy, just three kilometers from the center of Falaise, but the town still held out and Trun, to the east, was firmly in German hands. However, on August 16, elements of the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division broke into Falaise. Although it would take a two more days to completely secure the town that was now only defended by scattered and isolated groups of German soldiers, the Canadians could regroup their forces for a final push to capture Trun, link up with the Americans, and close the ever-narrowing escape corridor.
At the very moment that Canadian infantrymen were fighting their way into Falaise, Hitler was demanding that Kluge mount another counterattack. Pleading that any offensive action was quite impossible and that the best part of the German army in the west was about to be encircled, Kluge at last persuaded Hitler that a general withdrawal was the only option left and Hitler relented late that afternoon. Not to be denied some measure of revenge, Hitler sacked the Feldmarschall and had him recalled to Germany on the following day. Convinced that he was about face execution and dishonour, Kluge took his own life by swallowing poison on a stopover in Metz. Hitler, who had been unable to contact Kluge for some hours during the morning of August 17 and immediately suspected that he was conspiring with the enemy, was now convinced and greeted the news with the comment that Kluge “probably would have been arrested anyway.”
Kluge’s replacement as Oberbefehlshaber West was Feldmarshall Walter Model, who had made a reputation for himself in conducting defensive operations in the east, often saving desperate situations, and was greatly admired by Hitler. In contrast to Kluge, Model was given a free hand. His first order was that Hausser’s 7.Armee and Panzergruppe Eberbach should retreat immediately through the 20 kilometre wide gap that was still open south of Falaise on the afternoon of August 17, 1944. With the Americans once again advancing, it was crucial to hold open this corridor as long as possible. Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich’s II.SS-Panzerkorps were to hold off the British and Canadians on the northern edge, while on the southern front the remnants of XLVII.Panzerkorps, which had already been badly battered at Mortain, would hold the Americans.9
On August 18, the tanks of 1st Polish Armored Division, which had been organized into three battle groups, set off an a sweeping manoeuvre towards the south-east with the intention of outflanking Model’s armored units and linking up with the Americans who had taken Argentan. The Canadians captured Trun on the same day and by August 19 the Poles had reached the outskirts of Chambois, just eight kilometers from Argentan, and driven out the last of the German defenders by nightfall. That same evening they established contact with the units of the US 3rd Army. Everything did not, however, go in the Allies favor. As the Poles were fighting their way into Trun, a Kampfgruppe of 2.Panzer-Division had managed to break through the Canadian front at Saint-Lambert-sur-Dives, almost exactly between Trun and Chambois, and kept the road open for six hours while large numbers of German troops made their escape. Just before sunset the Canadians managed to regain their positions and, although small parties infiltrated the Allied lines during the night and crossed the River Dives to safety, the German’s escape route now known as the Falaise Gap was closed for the time being.
On the morning of August 20, 1944, Model ordered the remaining tanks of 2.SS-Panzer-Division and 9.SS-Panzer-Division to attack from outside the pocket towards the Polish positions on Hill 262, the high ground above the village of Coudehard referred to as Mont-Ormel, less than 6 kilometers to the north-east of Argentan.10
By noon, another Kampfgruppe made up of elements of 10.SS-Panzer-Division, 12.SS-Panzer-Division, and 116.Panzer-Division joined the battle and broke through the Poli
sh front, once again opening the gap. While the Poles were occupied at Mont-Ormel, a battle group from 9.SS-Panzer-Division prevented the Canadians from coming to their assistance and within a few hours approximately ten thousand Germans were able to escape. The Polish units on the high ground of Mont-Ormel were, however, able to direct a steady rain of artillery fire onto the retreating Germans and Obergruppenführer Hausser, who had arrived on the scene, ordered that the Poles be annihilated. Scraping together the remnants of 2.SS-Panzer-Division and 352.Infanterie-Division, he threw them at the Mont-Ormel positions, inflicting such damage that the defenders could only watch as the survivors of XLVII.Panzerkorps fled through the gap. Exhausted, both sides chose not to continue the fight after nightfall, although sporadic artillery fire continued to harass the retreating Germans.
On the following morning, at 11:00 am, a final attempt was made to overrun the Polish positions at Mont-Ormel. The attack was only narrowly defeated; little more than an hour after the Germans withdrew, the Canadians managed to reinforce the Polish units defending the hill. That afternoon, the survivors of the German divisions which had been attempting to keep the gap open were ordered to retreat towards the Seine. By the evening of Monday, August 21, Canadian armored units had reached the Polish forces at Coudehard, while two Canadian infantry divisions had taken Saint-Lambert-sur-Dives and secured the area north of Chambois. What had become known as the Falaise Pocket had finally been sealed.11